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ABSTRACT: Rational allocation of limited public resources is critical to achieve the stated 
aims of government programmes. Here, we focus on the regional allocation of public 
spending for disaster risk reduction in Bangladesh as a case study to identify the rationale that 
guides public funding allocations. It is well understood that any government’s public spending 
decision-making is also affected by considerations other than need, and our objective in this 
paper is to identify all of the directly observable determinants’ of publicly allocated and 
realized spending at the local government (sub-district) level. We employ the Heckman two-
stage selection model with detailed public finance and other data from 483 sub-districts 
(upazilas) across the country. While some of our results conform with our priors, our 
estimations surprisingly find that government does not respond to the sub-district’s risk 
exposure as a factor affecting the DRR financing mechanism. This variable is consistently 
counter-intuitively negative and statistically significant. The DRR regional allocations do not 
seem to be determined by risk and exposure, only weakly by vulnerability, nor even by more 
transparent political economy motivations. This is surprising, as the Bangladesh DRR program 
is considered a poster-child of DRR investments. 
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1. Introduction 
A burgeoning literature has emerged investigating the efficacy of public spending in 
lower income countries. For example, recently Sennoga and Matovu (2013) provided an 
investigation of public spending in Uganda, Ramirez (2004) investigated public infrastructure 
spending in Mexico, Kruse et al. (2012) examine public health spending in Indonesia, and 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) focus on a cross-country statistical analysis of levels of 
spending, institutional structures, and relevant outcomes. This literature also uses a wide 
variety of methodologies to approach this efficacy question: Sennoga and Matovu (2013) use 
general equilibrium modeling, Ramirez (2004) uses a vector error correction empirical model 
with impulse response functions, and Kruse et al. (2012) use panel data regression 
techniques.  
This literature assumes that public spending is indeed geared towards achieving the 
relevant favourable outcomes—productivity growth for infrastructure spending, better 
health service utilization for health spending, or improved literacy for education spending. 
More importantly, this literature implicitly assumes that funding is allocated optimally given 
these desired outcomes and the perceived community needs. It is this last assumption that 
we examine in this paper. We ask whether we can find evidence that public spending is indeed 
allocated rationally according to perceived needs, or whether we can identify other 
explanations for the pattern of de facto public spending. 
We focus on disaster risk reduction (DRR) spending in Bangladesh for several reasons. 
Disaster risk reduction spending has a clearly defined policy aim, and measurable outcomes. 
As such, DRR spending is maybe uniquely suited to examine the rationale for the regional 
allocation of public resources. Bangladesh has a long history with natural disasters due to its 
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geography and its location on the shores of the Bay of Bengal. Natural hazards in Bangladesh 
range from floods and cyclones to river bank erosion and droughts. Flooding associated with 
the monsoon season occurs each year. The monsoon rain plays a pivotal role in securing 
domestic agricultural production, but can also kill and devastate crops and livelihoods. Along 
the coasts, the most destructive cyclones generate storm surges that can inundate vast land 
areas, and have in the last few decades killed hundreds of thousands of people. Given all 
these; it is obvious that disaster planning and government-led disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
has been part of the Bangladeshi government’s economic planning process for a long time.  
Bangladesh, it is important to note, is widely perceived as poster-child for successful 
spending on DRR by a developing country. In particular, Bangladesh is often mentioned for its 
successful early warning programmes for cyclones, which is frequently favourably contrasted 
with neighbouring Burma after its catastrophic experience with cyclone Nargis in 2008. Most 
recently for cyclone Sidr in 2007, for example, Bangladesh managed to evacuate millions away 
from the coast and the storm’s surge (Paul and Dutt, 2010).1 Bangladesh’s successful disaster 
risk reduction policies is also mentioned in the context of the management of the annual 
monsoon floods (del Ninno et al., 2003). 
A demonstration of the crucial role that government safety net policies can play in 
DRR is the comparison of the severe flood of 1998 in comparison to an equally severe flood 
in 1974.2 In this case, in 1998, the government’s substantial disaster management facilities 
and emergency food and financial assistance through better management of targeted 
                                                             
1 For further data and a comparison of Sidr to previous storms, see p. 502 in IPCC (2012). 
2 The severity of the 1998 flood has been identified in terms of area affected (affecting two-thirds of the country) 
and lasted for a prolonged period (from early July till mid-September) in many areas and direct damages were 
estimated at US$2 billion (Khandker, 2007). 
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programs such as Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and Food For work (FFW), it is claimed, 
helped prevent mass starvation and other associated risks compared with the severe flood 
impacts of 1974.3 
Besides the already mentioned ease of determining the aim of DRR spending in the 
Bangladeshi context, its importance is also well established. Ex ante spending choices on 
disaster risk management has been advocated for by all the international aid multilaterals, as 
DRR’s importance in reducing mortality, morbidity, and risk to livelihoods is undisputed in 
Bangladesh, and elsewhere. The most recent example of this emphasis is the Philippines’ 
decision to initiate a US$293 million national disaster risk reduction and management fund 
that is targeted to be used for pre-disaster risk reduction activities. In Bangladesh, as well as 
in the Philippines, one of the more important decisions the central government consistently 
needs to make is how to allocate DRR program spending across communities to minimize and 
mitigate the risks associated with the natural hazards both countries are exposed to.  
Our focus here amounts to answering a basic question: ‘what determines public 
spending in disaster risk reduction and mitigation in Bangladesh?’ We believe that this 
particular question has important implications not only for DRR spending in Bangladesh—as 
important as that is—but also to DRR spending elsewhere, and more generally for 
government spending in low income countries and its challenges. 
We identify the determinants’ of per capita public spending on disaster risk reduction 
and mitigation at the local government (sub-district/upazila4) level in Bangladesh. The 
                                                             
3 For discussions and analysis of the impacts of floods in Bangladesh, see Khandker (2007) and Banerjee (2007). 
4 Bangladesh is divided into 7 administrative regions (Divisions), 64 districts (Zila) and 483 sub-districts (Upazila).    
Our primary focus in this investigation includes all 483 sub-districts. 
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objective of this study is to identify the rationale behind the allocation of public spending 
based on the stated aims of these DRR safety net programs.  
After describing the, admittedly very limited, literature that examines the 
determinants of public expenditure, we discuss our data in detail. Section 4 provides relevant 
descriptive and summary statistics of the variables we use, while section 5 presents the 
methodological framework and justifies our use of the Heckman two-step selection model. 
Section 6 examines the estimation results and interprets them. Finally, in Section 7 we 
conclude, identify potential caveats, and discuss possible future research.  
2.  The Determinants of Fiscal Spending? 
Oftentimes, natural disasters are perceived as an exogenous shock to the economy 
resulting in additional fiscal expenditure or re-adjustment of existing expenditure to finance 
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The financial aspects of post-disaster fiscal 
management has been examined in country-specific policy papers (e.g. Bangladesh after the 
1998 flood is examined in Benson and Clay, 2002, while Belize is analysed in Borensztein et 
al., 2009). Several cross-country studies have also attempted to measure the average ex post 
fiscal costs (in lost revenue and increased expenditures) of a proto-typical disaster (e.g. Noy 
and Nualsri, 2011 and Lis and Nickel, 2010) and a global assessment is provided in Hochrainer-
Stigler et al. (2014). Yet, none of these papers examine ex-ante disaster risk financing.  
As we have already noted in the introduction, we are not aware of any literature that 
attempts to examine the rationale behind central government’s financing to the regions; 
neither in the context of disaster risk financing, nor in other contexts. We aim to investigate 
the determinants of regional financing for DRR activities and examine whether these flows of 
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funds are conditional upon actual (or perceived) regional hazards, vulnerabilities, other socio-
economic regional attributes, and political affiliations at the local government level.5 Aldrich 
(2010) and Takasaki (2011) identify the ability of elites to capture post-disaster reconstruction 
spending in India and Samoa, respectively. 
The research project most closely related to our own work is Miller and Vela (2014). 
They examine the allocation of disaster funding (both preventative and for recovery) for 
Peruvian regions (districts in the Bangladesh context), and focus on whether distribution of 
public expenditure in both recovery and prevention categories is conditional upon the 
occurrence of natural disasters in the recent past and on exposure and vulnerability. The data 
they use, their empirical approach, and the questions they ask are all quite different, but 
ultimately they also find it difficult to correlate the spending they examine with measureable 
risk. 
3. What we define as DRR? 
We interpret the term DRR spending fairly broadly, given the often repeated insight 
that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’ and the increased awareness that social 
and socio-economic vulnerability is as important in determining a disaster’s impact as is the 
natural hazard itself. The need for social protection through the provision of social safety nets 
has been reiterated in various papers that focus on DRR (e.g. Pelham et al, 2011; Rahman and 
Choudhury, 2012; and World Bank, 2010). Relevant examples of disaster safety net6 programs 
                                                             
5 Indirectly, Hodler and Raschky (2014) identify political favoritism in regional allocations by examining the 
intensity of nighttime light in regions associated with the political leadership.  
6 In this paper, the term ‘Disaster Safety Net’ refers to particular social safety net programs that has embedded  
structural mechanism to participate in disaster risk reduction activities. 
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incorporated into a country’s DRR policies are Bangladesh’s National Disaster Management 
Prevention Strategy and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program.7  
An additional type of DRR activity that we include in our analysis is Investments in 
specific infrastructure whose aim is disaster prevention; again this type of DRR spending is 
widely recognized in the DRR literature (e.g. World Bank, 2010). For example, the Department 
of Disaster Management (DDM) in Bangladesh constructs bridges/culverts (up to 12 meter 
long) under its Annual Development Plan – the main aim for this infrastructure is DRR rather 
than development or poverty alleviation more broadly.  
The connection between the climate and disaster occurrence is obvious, but the 
causality from climatic change to disasters has only been emphasized in the past few years, 
and most forcefully by the IPCC in their Special Report on Extreme Events (IPCC, 2012). 
Another international organization that has emphasized the link between DRR and climate 
change adaptation is the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(e.g. UNISDR, 2009).8 We therefore also include an investigation of the US$350 million 
allocated by the Government of Bangladesh in fiscal years 2009-2013 to tackle climate change 
impacts. 
4. The possible determinants of DRR  
The future probability of exposure to hazards (and their probable intensity) is proxied 
in this paper by past experience of this hazard. In this case, we focus on DRR activities that 
                                                             
7 See Pelham et al (2011) for discussion of these two programs. 
8 See also Shamsuddoha et al. (2013). 
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are mostly related to flood exposure, and therefore focus on flood risk. We measure the past 
exposure to hazards using details of rainfall record in each region.9  
The two other components of disaster risk, after the hazard itself, is the exposure of 
the population, and its vulnerability. Socio-economic vulnerability is as important as 
geographical exposure in order to more fully understand community-level adaptive capacity. 
The past literature has identified indicators of socio-economic vulnerability to natural hazards 
and emphasizes the importance of integrating them into national disaster prevention 
planning (Cutter et al. 2009; Tapsell et al. 2010). This widely discussed need to insert this 
socio-economic perspective into DRR planning motivates our use of socio-economic 
indicators. 
The political dimension of natural disaster policy has also been receiving attention in 
recent years with a primary focus on the evident failure of politicians’ and voters’ to prioritize 
prevention over post-event response; see for example Healy and Malhotra (2009) and Garret 
and Sobel (2003) on US post-disaster funding, Cole et al. (2012) on India, and Fuchs and 
Rodriguez-Chamussy (2014) on Mexico. When funding is awarded ex ante, the evidence 
seems to suggest that governments favour spending in regions that are politically aligned with 
the party in power (e.g. Cohen and Werker, 2008), and this is the focus of our investigation 
into the political economy of fiscal spending on the regions. 
 
 
                                                             
9 The risk associated with geological hazards is much more difficult to forecast, and this partly justifies our 
choice to focus on Bangladesh, where disaster risk is generally only associated with climatological events 
(unlike, for example, Peru) – see, for example, Kerr (2011). 
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5. The Data 
The data for this study were collected from various Bangladeshi government sources 
described below, both online and in print. Appendix table 1 provides the precise definition of 
all the variables and their data sources.  
5.1 DRR Programs in Bangladesh 
The disaster risk reduction public spending data at the local government level was 
collected from publications of Bangladesh’s Ministry of Food (former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management) – the information was collected from the Ministry’s web portal where 
sub-district (upazila) disaster risk reduction and mitigation funding allocation data from FY 
(fiscal year) 2010-11 to FY2013-14 was available. For each year, the dataset records the 
‘allocation’ (allocated spending) and ‘expenses’ (realized spending) for the various disaster 
safety net programmes - Test Relief (TR), Food For Work (FFW), Gratuitous Relief (GR) and 
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF). It also records the same information for the DRR 
infrastructure programme (bridges and culvert construction) and the climate change fund 
(also known as the climate investment fund). These various programs are described below. 
The Test Relief (TR) program has been implemented every year since 1975 in rural 
areas. This programme is mainly for repairing roads, damaged infrastructure such as schools 
and clinics, and other rural activities. It provides employment opportunities by providing 8 
kilograms of rice/wheat to every person in return for working 7 hours/day in specific projects 
related to disaster risk reduction and mitigation. The Gratuitous Relief (GR) programme 
(established in 1973) is designed to provide a maximum of 20 kilograms of rice/wheat to worst 
affected poor households with no associated work requirements. Vulnerable Group Feeding 
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(VGF) is another form of gratuitous relief (i.e. without work requirement) and is normally 
launched during or after a disaster and attempts to assist people remaining vulnerable to 
hunger.  
The Food For Work (FFW) program has been implemented since 1975 and is designed 
for construction, maintenance, reconstruction and development of rural infrastructure. 
Based on government food and monetary support, various rural infrastructural projects 
(many of them aimed at reducing vulnerability) are financed under this program during 
normal times and in post-disaster scenarios with work requirements. Among these 
infrastructure projects, the Department of Disaster Management funds construction of 
bridge/culverts (up to 12 meter long) under the Annual Development Programme of the 
Bangladesh Government (Bridges and Culverts programme).  
Data has been aggregated by adding up allocations in general and special categories 
under each DRR programme for each of the 483 sub-districts. We converted the food 
allocations in some of these programs into its monetary value using the contemporaneous 
(average) market price of rice in Dhaka (wholesale price). We aggregate both food and cash 
amount to get total allocation under each particular DRR activity for each sub-district. We 
then divide total allocated and realized spending amounts for each program/sub-district by 
the size of the population of each corresponding sub-district.  
5.2 Rainfall Hazard Data 
Due to its geographical location in the South-Eastern part of Hindu-Kush Himalayan 
region and being at the confluence of three major rivers – the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and 
the Meghna, Bangladesh is an extremely flood-prone. River-bank flooding occurs mostly 
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during the monsoon period (May-October) is the most frequent case.10 High rainfall is 
primarily the reason of river-bank floods. Here, we calculate a rainfall-based flood risk 
probability index for 483 sub-districts of Bangladesh to examine the sensitivity government 
DRR spending to flood risks. The index captures historical rainfall variability to determine local 
(sub-district) flood risks. In as much as this index is based on past experiences, it does not 
capture the projected future changes that are associated with climatic change. 
To develop this index, we collected annual rainfall data for 64 years for 35 weather 
stations covering the whole country from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department 
(BMD).11 The BMD records daily rainfall data since 1948 for all available weather stations 
across the country. We first calculated total monthly rainfall for each year under each weather 
station. We next calculated the mean and standard deviation for each month for each sub-
district by matching weather stations with sub-districts.12 We develop two indexes of low- 
and high-risk indices. For the low flood risk, we count the number of months over the 64 years 
for which we have data with extreme rainfall using two thresholds: monthly rainfall exceeding 
15% of average annual rainfall for this sub-district; and monthly rainfall exceeding one 
standard deviation above the mean for that month throughout the available time period.13  
We calculate the average number of months with extreme rainfall to obtain the 
probability of flooding occurring annually in that particular weather station (and consequently 
sub-district). The mean probability is 0.93 with 0.16 standard deviation. The second index, 
                                                             
10 Other, less common types of flooding are the flash floods (in hilly areas) and storm surges (along the coast). 
11 The available data were for the years 1948-2012. 
12 In cases where a sub-district did not have a rainfall measurement station, we used an average of the three 
nearest stations.  
13 The historical coverage of rainfall data in BMD weather stations varies depending upon their establishment 
year. Therefore, we calculate the average number of months with extreme rainfall by dividing with the total 
number of rainfall years available to calculate the probability of annual flooding in that particular weather 
station. 
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high flood risk, is constructed similarly, but in this case the two thresholds are 20% of average 
annual rainfall and more than two standard deviation above the monthly mean. For the high-
risk measure, the mean probability is 0.26 with 0.08 standard deviation.  
5.3 Other Variables 
Population numbers and poverty rates for each the sub-district (annually) were 
collated from government circular orders of the Department of Disaster Management. Our 
proxy for ‘economic development’ for each sub-district is a composite variable averaging the 
shares of the population with access to basic amenities (electricity, safe drinking water, and 
sanitation facilities). This data were collected from the 2011 Population and Housing Census 
of Bangladesh.  
To capture the importance of politics in allocation of funding from the central 
government to the regions, we construct a political binary variable that measures whether 
the Member of Parliament (MP) representing the sub-district belongs to the main political 
party in power. To construct this variable, we divide the 300 electoral constituencies with 
respect to 483 sub-districts based upon the electoral delimitation information on the 
Bangladesh Gazette (2013). Information regarding election results and the sub-district 
representatives has been collected from the Bangladesh Election Commission report of 2008.  
According to the Coastal Zone Policy of the Government of Bangladesh (2005), the 
zone is divided into ‘exposed coast’ (the area/upazilas that front the sea directly, and ‘interior 
coast’ (the area/upazilas that are located behind the exposed coast). Here, we include both 
groups to create the ‘coastal belt binary variable’. Another dummy variable has been created 
to capture ethnic divisions within the sub-district. Bangladesh, unlike some of its neighbours, 
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is relatively homogenous. We include a variable noting if indigenous ethnic minorities reside 
in the sub-district. To create this ethnicity dummy, we use information from the 2011 
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh. We add two more binary variables. The first 
identifies the central sub-district in any particular district (in most cases that implies bigger 
populations, higher degree of urbanization and more industrialized). The other binary 
measures indicate urban sub-districts associated with the two mega-cities in Bangladesh 
(Dhaka and Chittagong).  
6. Descriptive Statistics and Model Specification 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of public spending on DRR in Bangladesh, 
including both allocated and realized spending for the fiscal year 2010-11 to 2013-14 for each 
of the programmes described earlier. These statistics include mean, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum of allocated and realized spending for Test Relief (TR), Vulnerable 
Group Feeding (VGF), Food For Work (FFW), Gratuitous Relief (GR), Infrastructure Spending 
(Bridges and Culvert construction under FFW) and Climate Investment Fund (CIF). On average, 
TR received the highest amount of funding per capita followed by VGF while the maximum 
amount in a single sub-district has been distributed through the VGF program.  
Table 2 documents the descriptive statistics of all the independent (RHS) variables. 
The mean population size in each sub-district is 0.26 million. The mean probability of low and 
high flood-risk assigned to each sub-district is 0.935 and 0.258 respectively. Although the 
current ethnic population size is just over 2 million people, 46% of the sub-districts include 
some ethnic minorities indicating their dispersal across a wide range of sub-districts. The 
political risk dummy indicates that fully 77% of sub-districts are represented by MPs from the 
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ruling party as a consequence of the 2008 general election. 19% of the 483 sub-districts are 
in the coastal zone.  
We also examine the difference, in the Bangladeshi government’s accounts, between 
the allocated vs. realized spending, and whether the two are determined differently. We do 
not have a pre-conceived notion of the types of influences that affect the regional allocation 
of public spending, but for DRR spending, we assume that these are determined by the 
perception of risk, by socio-economic vulnerability, and by political and geographic factors.  
Some sub-districts do not receive any funding for some of the DRR programs we 
investigate over some fiscal years. Due to this truncation of the data, we employ a two-stage 
Heckman selection model to identify the determinants’ of public spending on disaster risk 
reduction and mitigation. To construct this two-stage Heckman selection model, we start with 
the following premise: 
𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑣 , 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖)   [1] 
Public spending (SPEND) in sub-district (i), for program (j), at fiscal year (t), is a function of 
several variables. The perceived risk (risk) which is calculated as an index constructed from 
past exposure, with low and high thresholds (v). Spending is also a function of the population 
(pop) and poverty (pov) rates in the receiving sub-district, and measures of socio-economic 
deprivation (dep: measured as access to certain assets – see the data discussion earlier in 
section 5). This public spending is also a function of a set of characteristics, measured as binary 
variables (vector D), that include political affiliation with the centre, presence of ethnic 
minorities, being a district headquarter, belonging to either of the two large metropolitan 
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areas, and a coastal location. The spending variable measures either the allocated or realized 
equivalent for each sub-district, fiscal year, and DRR programme (indicated by superscript x). 
Our theoretical prior is that these determinants’ should have positive relationship with 
sub-district DRR funding allocation. Ceteris paribus, a sub-district with higher perceived risk, 
more poverty, less access to assets, more deprivation, more political connections, and a 
coastal location should be receiving more DRR funding (either allocated or realized). We are 
agnostic regarding several of the other controls, including location as a district headquarter 
or as part of the two metropolitan agglomerations, and the presence of ethnic minorities. 
Given the truncated nature of this allocation (many sub-districts get nothing), we 
estimate the model in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of getting 
funding (𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 > 0). More formally, the funding selection equation defines the cases 
where a particular sub-district has received or been allocated funding in any targeted 
program: 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0
  and   𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   [2] 
Where, 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a latent variable indicating funding, and is the dependent variable of the 
selection equation [2]. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of covariates, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the random disturbance term. 
The selection variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡  is binary and we therefore use a probit regression specification to 
estimate the first stage selection equation [2]. The second stage specifies the outcome (public 
spending) equation where public spending (allocated or realized) is the dependent variable. 
The model specification for the second stage equation is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡        [3] 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the dependent variable of the outcome equation, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of covariates, 
𝛽 is a vector of coefficients and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the random disturbance term. The selection equation 
(first stage) includes the population variable which is not included in the outcome equation 
(second stage).14 
7. Estimation Results 
The estimation results for the two-stage Heckman selection model for allocated 
spending are documented in tables 3-4. The first two columns show the estimated coefficients 
of low and high flood risks along with a set of socio-economic and geo-political controls with 
the dependent variable being total allocated spending for per capita disaster risk reduction 
spending.15 Columns (3) and (4) present the estimated coefficients for non-obligatory public 
funding16 for low- and high- flood risks consecutively, while columns (5) and (6) do the same 
for obligatory public funding.17  
Table 3 reports the results from the first stage selection regression. Among the 
independent (RHS) variables; poverty rate, socio-economic status, coastal location, and 
population size are found to be sign consistent with our previous predictions. In terms of 
statistical significance, coastal location is significant at 1% level in all cases, while economic 
development is significant at the 10% level. Interestingly; ethnic minority presence, district 
                                                             
14 Heckman (1979) suggests that the outcome and selection equation are correlated and dependent variable 
(public spending) of the outcome equation is observed only if the a particular sub-district has received funding 
in any targeted program which also indicates: ui ~ N (0, σ), εi ~ N (0, 1), corr (ui , εi ) =  ρ; where ρ denotes the 
correlation between errors of the two stages been defined.  
15 This refers to the summation of all public funds (per capita) that were allocated for disaster risk reduction in all 
the previously described programmes except the climate investment fund. We estimated the impacts on the 
climate fund separately.  
16 Non-obligatory per capita public funding are dispersed through targeted safety net programs which do not 
have work requirements in their structural mechanism. Here, the non-obligatory safety net programs are 
Gratuitous Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding. 
17 Obligatory public funding are dispersed through programmes which include work requirements. Here, the 
obligatory programmes are Test Relief, Food For Work and Bridges and Culvert construction. 
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headquarter and urban centre indicator variables all have negative coefficient estimates 
(though these are statistically insignificant). The most striking results are for the risk and 
political variables. Both perception of low and high flood risk variables appear to have a 
counter-intuitive negative relationship with DRR funding allocation with consistent statistical 
significance. The political connection to the centre indicator also has a counter-intuitive 
negative sign but this estimate is statistically insignificant.  
Table 4 presents the second stage estimation where the dependent variable is DRR 
per capita allocated funding of the sub-districts which have received funding. The poverty 
rate, economic development, and coastal effect again show positive signs (consistently with 
our priors) with statistical insignificance. In contrast to our selection estimation, the outcome 
for ethnicity and district headquarter showed positive association with DRR funding 
allocation. However, as in the first-stage estimations, political connections and flood risks 
showed negative association with allocated spending patterns. In particular, a one standard 
deviation increase in high flood risk leads to 0.33 standard deviation decrease in predicted 
per capita DRR allocated spending compare to 0.38 s.d. decrease in case of low flood risk. This 
result is the most intriguing, and we view it as the most important. Taken overall, and in 
particular this finding about flood risk measure, our findings suggest there is no evident logic 
to the way the Bangladeshi government allocated its DRR funding.  
 We report the same set of first- and second-stage Heckman selection regressions for 
realized funding (rather than allocated funding) in appendix tables 2 and 3 respectively. All 
columns in these two tables represent the same set of variables with the dependent variable 
being per capita realized funding in DRR. To a large extent, the results are very similar. In 
particular, we observe a similar pattern for the two variables we singled out earlier: flood risks 
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and political connection. Again, low and high flood risks tend to show negative relationship 
with statistically significant coefficient estimates, while the political connection variable 
appears to have a negative association with funding but with statistical significance at 10% 
level observed in only one case. A one standard deviation increase in high flood risk leads to 
0.39 standard deviation decrease in predicted per capita DRR realized spending compare to 
0.38 s.d. decrease in case of low flood risk. 
We report Heckman two stage regression results for climate investment fund 
separately in tables 5 and 6. The first two columns in table 5 display the determinants of sub-
district wise per capita allocated public spending on climate change. Columns (3) and (4) 
portray the impacts on per capita realized public spending for the same set of independent 
variables as in columns (1) and (2). In table 5 and among the independent variables; coastal 
location, urban centre, and district headquarter shows, once again, sign consistency with our 
priors, but with only the coastal location indicator coefficient being highly significant (at 1% 
level) in all cases. Poverty rate, socio-economic status, ethnicity and population size are not 
similarly consistent. As before, the most intriguing of the reported results are negative 
coefficients for flood risk measures and the political connection variable; in this case, 
however, the coefficients are not always statistically significantly different from zero.  
The second stage regression results for the climate investment fund, in table 6, shows 
similar patterns of the earlier table 5. Among the RHS variables; poverty rate, ethnicity, and 
the urban centre show sign consistency with no statistical significance. Socio-economic status, 
district headquarter, and the coastal location measures show sign inconsistency with the 
latter two in contrast with the selection equation results. For the climate investment fund, 
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we no longer observe the counter-intuitive and statistically significant negative coefficients 
for flood risks. However, these estimates are also not statistically different from zero.  
8. Conclusion 
Bangladesh is a low-income country. Its natural disaster risk will not change 
dramatically in the near future, though its risk clearly extends beyond the immediate disaster 
effects to future impacts associated with climate change. As is true for almost any public 
programme of fiscal spending, rational allocation of limited public resources is critical to the 
stated aims of the programmes we examine (i.e., enhance households’ coping abilities to 
reduce and mitigate disasters risks). Clearly, the effectiveness of prevention spending is 
important, and equally obviously the first pre-condition for any effective spending, not 
exclusively for DRR, is that this spending is allocated rationally across space.  
It is well understood that any government’s public spending decision-making 
processes are affected by other considerations rather than need, but the balance between 
these competing pressures is not obviously clear. Our objective in this paper is to identify the 
determinants’ of publicly allocated and realized spending at the local government (sub-
district) level in Bangladesh. We employ the Heckman two-stage selection model to 
empirically estimate the covariates where we assume public spending is a function of the 
probability of flood risks, population size, poverty rate, socio-economic development, political 
connections, ethnic composition, and details about the geo-location of the sub-district.  
While some of our results conform with our priors (where these priors are well 
formed), it is surprising to note that the presence of the ruling party’s elected candidates fails 
to become a statistically important factor when it is time to attract DRR funding.  
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The most intriguing finding of this study, however, is the response to the sub-district 
flood risk probabilities as a factor affecting the DRR financing mechanism. This variable is 
consistently counter-intuitively negative and statistically significant. This result, we should 
add, is also observed when we do not control for coastal location, when we add other 
variables, and when we estimate a simpler linear model. 
To summarize, we find little evidence (and some counter-evidence) of any rationale in 
the regional funding allocation decisions of the Bangladeshi government. The DRR regional 
allocations do not seem to be determined by risk and exposure, and only weakly by 
vulnerability. Even obvious and transparent political economy motivations do not seem to 
explain much of the variation in inter-regional funding. These funding decisions appear to be 
much murkier than we expected them to be. This surprised us, as the Bangladesh DRR 
program is considered a poster-child of DRR investments. Of course, our result are about DRR 
funding. Whether the same can be said of other types of central government funding in 
Bangladesh, or whether this is indeed typical of regional allocations in lower-income countries 
are all still open questions that require evidence-based answers. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS A: LEFT-HAND SIDE VARIABLES 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
Note: The acronyms used here represents test relief, food for work, infrastructure, gratuitous relief, 
vulnerable group feeding and climate investment fund respectively. Allocated and realized for each 
safety net program indicates total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated and total (per 
capita) amount of public fund been spent out of total allocation in disaster risk reduction consecutively. 
The currency unit is in BDT (Bangladeshi Taka) [1 USD = 75.79 BDT]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
 
OBSERVATION 
 
MEAN 
 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
 
MINIMUM 
 
MAXIMUM 
TR_ALLOCATED 483 12.37298 17.5886 0 137.6302 
TR_REALIZED 483 9.809799 14.28539 0 95.31361 
FFW_ALLOCATED 483 5.443759 13.4828 0 126.3999 
FFW_REALIZED 483 3.819665 9.05842 0 90.41516 
INFRA_ALLOCATED 483 3.15629 9.593239 0 102.8087 
INFRA_REALIZED 483 1.96463 7.554146 0 102.8087 
GR_ALLOCATED 483 2.145435 20.45798 0 374.9262 
GR_REALIZED 483 1.607032 17.19828 0 374.9262 
VGF_ALLOCATED 483 5.799361 42.9692 0 921.9801 
VGF_REALIZED 483 5.967508 43.00797 0 921.9801 
CIF_ALLOCATED 483 1.28391 5.476021 0 58.71323 
CIF_REALIZED 483 0.9925554 4.739405 0 58.46924 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS B: RIGHT-HAND SIDE VARIABLES 
 
VARIABLES 
 
OBSERVATION 
 
MEAN 
 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
 
MINIMUM 
 
MAXIMUM 
POPULATION 483 255833.4 138584.8 17152 941005 
FLRISK_LOW 483 0.9347943 0.156718 0.6818 1.909 
FLRISK_HIGH 483 0.2577505 0.078411 0.123 0.7272 
POVERTY RATE 483 28.3388 13.23799 1.9 68 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
483 52.60449 11.12422 8.1 73.5 
ETHNICITY 483 0.4637681 0.499203 0 1 
DISTRICT HQ 483 0.1325052 0.339391 0 1 
POLITICAL RISK 483 .7763975 .4170906   0 1 
URBAN EFFECT 483 0.0393375 0.194598 0 1 
COASTAL EFFECT 483 0.1904762 0.393084 0 1 
 Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
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             TABLE 3: ALLOCATED SPENDING: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
ALLOCATED SPENDING – HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF _NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF _NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF 
_OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF 
_OBLIGATORY 
       
FLRISK_LOW -0.668*  -1.336***  -0.668*  
 (0.387)  (0.450)  (0.387)  
FLRISK_HIGH  -1.760**  -1.058  -1.760** 
  (0.816)  (0.880)  (0.816) 
POVERTY RATE 0.00581 0.00691 0.00598 0.00489 0.00581 0.00691 
 (0.00526) (0.00533) (0.00541) (0.00545) (0.00526) (0.00533) 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
0.0109* 0.0117* 0.0114* 0.0115* 0.0109* 0.0117* 
 (0.00601) (0.00605) (0.00645) (0.00646) (0.00601) (0.00605) 
ETHNICITY -0.0173 -0.0498 0.0437 0.0241 -0.0173 -0.0498 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.141) (0.141) (0.136) (0.137) 
DISTRICT HQ -0.0602 -0.0763 -0.0564 -0.0691 -0.0602 -0.0763 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.212) (0.210) (0.206) (0.206) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.210 -0.228 -0.239 -0.215 -0.210 -0.228 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.150) 
URBAN EFFECT -0.102 -0.110 -0.553 -0.615* -0.102 -0.110 
 (0.346) (0.346) (0.341) (0.339) (0.346) (0.346) 
COASTAL EFFECT 0.730*** 0.693*** 0.628*** 0.690*** 0.730*** 0.693*** 
 (0.176) (0.179) (0.164) (0.167) (0.176) (0.179) 
POPULATION 6.73E-07 7.58E-07 4.20E-07 5.19E-07 6.73E-07 7.58E-07 
 (5.30E-07) (5.30E-07) (5.38E-07) (5.35E-07) (5.30E-07) (5.30E-07) 
CONSTANT -0.0644 -0.292 -0.0358 -1.022** -0.0644 -0.292 
 (0.542) (0.452) (0.607) (0.487) (0.542) (0.452) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 483 483 
         Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
        Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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          TABLE 4: ALLOCATED SPENDING: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
ALLOCATED SPENDING – HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF _NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF _NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF 
_OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF                         
_OBLIGATORY 
       
FLRISK_LOW -162.3  -262.0  -97.41  
 (126.5)  (382.8)  (72.45)  
FLRISK_HIGH  -282.5  -226.3  -126.2 
  (257.8)  (277.3)  (128.8) 
POVERTY RATE 1.651 1.729 1.876 1.667 0.652 0.597 
 (1.362) (1.298) (2.066) (1.536) (0.780) (0.649) 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
0.752 0.804 1.260 1.134 0.362 0.256 
 (2.104) (1.908) (3.552) (2.814) (1.205) (0.954) 
ETHNICITY 15.70 12.43 35.07 31.93 -3.257 -5.000 
 (25.73) (23.76) (35.83) (29.86) (14.73) (11.87) 
DISTRICT HQ 15.50 15.09 4.756 5.749 12.03 11.08 
 (34.87) (32.34) (42.29) (37.71) (19.97) (16.16) 
POLITICAL RISK -39.52 -39.02 -51.82 -46.43 -19.00 -15.95 
 (39.84) (36.94) (68.66) (52.19) (22.81) (18.46) 
URBAN EFFECT -35.03 -36.91 -97.73 -97.80 -13.65 -14.88 
 (59.25) (55.23) (148.6) (128.1) (33.93) (27.60) 
COASTAL EFFECT 91.51 84.87 110.1 107.9 41.50 34.06 
 (92.61) (74.96) (153.2) (130.9) (53.03) (37.46) 
CONSTANT -32.05 -103.1 -107.6 -254.1 10.87 -24.05 
 (217.3) (204.3) (303.9) (423.3) (124.4) (102.1) 
LAMBDA 216.9 202.7 228.4 204.4 124.2 101.3 
 (232.7) (195.6) (358.6) (274.1) (133.2) (97.76) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 483 483 
     Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
     Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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   TABLE 5: CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND - HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 
VARIABLES 
ALLOCATED 
SPENDING 
ALLOCATED 
SPENDING 
REALIZED 
SPENDING 
REALIZED 
SPENDING 
     
FLRISK_LOW -0.653  -0.353  
 (1.011)  (0.995)  
FLRISK_HIGH  -1.773  -1.764 
  (2.096)  (2.201) 
POVERTY RATE -0.00991 -0.0105 -0.00940 -0.00948 
 (0.00903) (0.00893) (0.00908) (0.00899) 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
-0.0191* -0.0181* -0.0212** -0.0198* 
 (0.00975) (0.00991) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
ETHNICITY -1.155*** -1.189*** -1.022*** -1.055*** 
 (0.373) (0.376) (0.368) (0.372) 
DISTRICT HQ 0.191 0.178 0.244 0.236 
 (0.375) (0.375) (0.379) (0.378) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.460* -0.480* -0.344 -0.358 
 (0.277) (0.279) (0.283) (0.287) 
URBAN EFFECT 0.120 0.119 0.132 0.152 
 (0.473) (0.469) (0.472) (0.469) 
COASTAL EFFECT 2.044*** 2.014*** 2.054*** 2.009*** 
 (0.262) (0.266) (0.266) (0.267) 
POPULATION -1.36e-06 -1.30e-06 -1.19e-06 -1.15e-06 
 (1.08e-06) (1.07e-06) (1.08e-06) (1.08e-06) 
CONSTANT 0.604 0.433 0.214 0.277 
 (1.084) (0.830) (1.079) (0.842) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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   TABLE 6: CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND - HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION 
VARIABLES 
ALLOCATED 
SPENDING 
ALLOCATED 
SPENDING 
REALIZED 
SPENDING 
REALIZED 
SPENDING 
     
FLRISK_LOW 7.311  28.92  
 (26.69)  (25.74)  
FLRISK_HIGH  67.83  73.88 
  (53.90)  (60.44) 
POVERTY RATE 0.208 0.201 0.232 0.223 
 (0.201) (0.214) (0.186) (0.226) 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
-0.163 -0.251 -0.329 -0.274 
 (0.318) (0.317) (0.357) (0.382) 
ETHNICITY 5.920 5.936 3.200 5.636 
 (16.04) (17.06) (14.71) (17.64) 
DISTRICT HQ -6.950 -6.612 -4.799 -5.124 
 (5.857) (6.068) (5.345) (6.469) 
POLITICAL RISK 8.735 9.068 8.268 8.481 
 (6.698) (7.123) (5.468) (6.791) 
URBAN EFFECT 3.509 3.966 6.888 5.218 
 (8.478) (8.574) (7.912) (9.158) 
COASTAL EFFECT -16.35 -17.99 -10.78 -20.71 
 (28.15) (28.08) (30.36) (32.97) 
CONSTANT 32.25 31.07 10.40 31.30 
 (30.26) (20.98) (33.93) (24.59) 
LAMBDA -14.71 -16.39 -11.47 -17.28 
 (17.77) (18.32) (18.71) (21.27) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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   APPENDIX TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES DEFINED AND THEIR SOURCES 
 
NO. 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
SOURCE 
1 POPULATION The total number of people residing in each sub-district.        
 
Department of Disaster Management, Government 
of Bangladesh. 
2 TR_ALLOCATED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
disaster risk reduction through test relief program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh.  
3 TR_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in disaster risk reduction through test relief 
program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
4 FFW_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
disaster risk reduction through Food For Work program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
5 FFW_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in disaster risk reduction through Food For 
Work program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
6 INFRA_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
bridges and culvert construction under Food For Work program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
7 INFRA_REALIZED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in bridges and culvert construction under Food 
For Work program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
8 GR_ALLOCATED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
disaster risk reduction through gratuitous relief program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
9 GR_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in disaster risk reduction through gratuitous 
relief program. 
  
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
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10 VGF_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
disaster risk reduction through vulnerable group feeding 
program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
11 VGF_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in disaster risk reduction through vulnerable 
group feeding program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
12 CIF_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated in 
climate investment fund to combat climate change induced 
risks. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
13 CIF_REALIZED   The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out of 
total allocation in climate investment fund to combat climate 
change induced risks. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
14 FLRISK_LOW Also defined as ‘low flood risk’. The number of times each sub-
district is likely to incur flood risk each year. The threshold is the 
number of months each sub-district has total rainfall higher than 
15% of average annual rainfall and more than 1 standard 
deviation above the mean divided by the number of years’ 
rainfall data has been recorded for each weather station 
corresponding to each sub-district out of 64 year time span.   
 
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) 
rainfall data of 64 years (1948-2012) for 35 weather 
stations of Bangladesh. 
15 FLRISK_HIGH Also defined as ‘high flood risk’. The number of times each sub-
district is likely to incur flood risk each year. The threshold is the 
number of months each sub-district has total rainfall higher than 
20% of average annual rainfall and more than 2 standard 
deviation above the mean divided by the number of years’ 
rainfall data has been recorded for each weather station 
corresponding to each sub-district out of 64 year time span.   
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) 
rainfall data of 64 years (1948-2012) for 35 weather 
stations of Bangladesh. 
16 POVERTY RATE The number of people living below the national poverty line of 
US$ 2 per day. 
 
Department of Disaster Management, Government 
of Bangladesh. 
17 ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
This is a composite variable averaging the percentage of 
population under each sub-district to get access to safe drinking 
water, sanitation facilities and electricity.  
 
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh, 2011. 
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18 ETHNICITY Dummy variable; 1 if indigenous ethnic minorities resides in any 
sub-district, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations using 
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh, 2011. 
19 DISTRICT HQ Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district is central (in most cases, 
bigger population size and main economic centre) in any 
particular district, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
20 POLITICAL RISK Dummy variable; 1 if the Member of Parliament (MP) is from 
the main political party in power, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations using Bangladesh Election 
Commission Report, 2008 and Bangladesh Gazette 
(2013).  
21 URBAN EFFECT Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district belongs to the bigger 
urban cities; Dhaka or Chittagong, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
22 COASTAL EFFECT Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district belongs to any districts 
situated in the coastal belts a, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
 Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
Note: a ‘Coastal Zone’ is most frequently defined as land affected by its proximity to the sea and that part of the sea affected by its proximity to the 
land (Kamaluddin and Kaudstaal, 2003). According to the Coastal Zone Policy (2005) of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), the zone is divided into 
‘exposed coast’ (the area/upazilas that embraces the sea directly and is subject to be affected highly by the anticipated sea level rise, also known as 
first tier coastal upazilas) and ‘interior coast’ (the area/upazilas that are located behind the exposed coast, can also be sub-divided into second and 
third tier coastal upazilas). Here, we consider the first and second tier coastal upazilas to create the ‘coastal effect’ dummy variable.                
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                   APPENDIX TABLE 2: REALIZED SPENDING: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
REALIZED SPENDING – HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 
 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF_NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_NON-
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_ 
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_  
OBLIGATORY 
       
FLRISK_LOW -0.732*  -1.269***  -0.726*  
 (0.388)  (0.448)  (0.388)  
FLRISK_HIGH  -1.887**  -0.923  -1.582* 
  (0.818)  (0.878)  (0.815) 
POVERTY RATE 0.00608 0.00721 0.00591 0.00475 0.00586 0.00654 
 (0.00526) (0.00533) (0.00541) (0.00546) (0.00525) (0.00532) 
ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT 
0.00987 0.0107* 0.0130** 0.0131** 0.00908 0.00970 
 (0.00601) (0.00605) (0.00649) (0.00649) (0.00600) (0.00604) 
ETHNICITY 0.00491 -0.0300 0.0612 0.0439 0.00713 -0.0227 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.141) (0.142) (0.136) (0.137) 
DISTRICT HQ -0.0443 -0.0618 -0.0498 -0.0619 -0.0809 -0.0973 
 (0.207) (0.206) (0.211) (0.210) (0.206) (0.206) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.191 -0.210 -0.256* -0.231 -0.142 -0.151 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) 
URBAN EFFECT -0.0910 -0.100 -0.541 -0.602* -0.0764 -0.0914 
 (0.346) (0.346) (0.341) (0.339) (0.346) (0.346) 
COASTAL EFFECT 0.737*** 0.699*** 0.575*** 0.641*** 0.762*** 0.741*** 
 (0.176) (0.179) (0.164) (0.167) (0.176) (0.178) 
POPULATION 7.08E-07 8.00E-07 4.10E-07 5.04E-07 7.73E-07 8.58E-07 
 (5.30E-07) (5.31E-07) (5.38E-07) (5.35E-07) (5.30E-07) (5.30E-07) 
CONSTANT -0.00818 -0.266 -0.176 -1.131** -0.0395 -0.356 
 (0.543) (0.453) (0.608) (0.489) (0.543) (0.452) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 483 483 
               Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
              Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.                              
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            APPENDIX TABLE 3: REALIZED SPENDING: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
  
REALIZED SPENDING – HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF_ 
NON-OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_ 
NON-OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_ 
OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF_ 
OBLIGATORY 
       
FLRISK_LOW -144.2  -242.2  -77.22  
 (131.9)  (380.7)  (64.50)  
FLRISK_HIGH  -292.0  -196.5  -123.6 
  (265.5)  (281.5)  (108.9) 
POVERTY RATE 1.665 1.767 1.874 1.681 0.612 0.605 
 (1.367) (1.307) (2.145) (1.669) (0.668) (0.582) 
ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT 
0.834 0.904 1.745 1.671 0.243 0.217 
 (1.960) (1.794) (4.102) (3.413) (0.921) (0.782) 
ETHNICITY 22.23 18.37 39.15 36.52 0.993 -0.781 
 (26.47) (24.13) (39.73) (34.43) (13.55) (11.43) 
DISTRICT HQ 17.06 16.47 6.029 6.977 10.67 10.14 
 (35.62) (33.08) (43.66) (40.99) (17.75) (15.31) 
POLITICAL RISK -39.40 -40.08 -57.33 -53.14 -14.69 -14.03 
 (37.55) (35.14) (75.73) (60.39) (16.92) (14.69) 
URBAN EFFECT -31.40 -32.29 -100.4 -104.3 -9.222 -10.44 
 (59.03) (55.39) (152.8) (139.5) (29.93) (25.94) 
COASTAL EFFECT 93.27 84.62 103.2 106.7 41.59 35.43 
 (90.62) (73.34) (148.6) (135.8) (44.75) (34.85) 
CONSTANT -68.70 -121.4 -157.1 -308.3 -6.978 -33.44 
 (205.1) (195.7) (352.5) (492.6) (100.0) (91.88) 
LAMBDA 216.7 203.7 234.9 221.4 110.1 95.49 
 (224.6) (188.6) (374.6) (303.2) (106.5) (83.93) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 483 483 
          Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
         Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
